In recent years, information campaigns and disinformation have continued to pose a growing threat to democracy. Since 2016, when influence campaigns began to be systematically analyzed, the increase and progressive sophistication of disinformation campaigns conducted on both social media and traditional media, often within more complex information operations, have raised growing concerns and interest at both institutional and social media company levels, as well as in academic research.

There is now a more widespread awareness that disinformation operations pose a danger to the maintenance of democratic governance systems and can contribute to corrupting the integrity of political deliberation. However, there still exists a multiplicity of analysis structures and differences in defining the problem and its components, making it challenging to develop common responses, both at the institutional and public administration levels and at the level of digital platforms, or public/private partnerships not only at the national but also international level.

This research, conducted through collaboration between the Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, Luiss Data Lab, the Department of Law at Luiss Guido Carli University, the Master's in Journalism and Multimedia Communication at Luiss Guido Carli University, the University of Michigan, and the Institute of Digital Geopolitics, aims to investigate separate research areas related to the analysis of information operations and the development of countermeasures. The goal is to promote the use of common terms, analysis structures, and research methodologies across different study areas for the analysis of information operations, with a particular focus on disinformation campaigns.

Before delving into the ethnographic research, which focused on disinformation campaigns in Italy, and legal research, which compared different legal systems on the topic, it is essential to make necessary introductory remarks. These illuminate the broad and long-term analysis framework.

While these types of operations are not new from a strategic perspective (consider, for example, the so-called "active measures" carried out by the Soviet Union during the Cold War), technological innovations and changes in the information ecosystem in recent years have added additional layers of complexity. This has led to the development of new and more sophisticated tactics and strategies, making these campaigns faster and more effective. Various groups of actors, both public and private, domestic and foreign, can deceptively intervene in democratic debates.

Given the relatively recent and evolving nature of these threats, there is still no clear and unified response policy, both at the national and multilateral levels. Therefore, it is considered urgent and of particular relevance to study methodologies and analyze cases to develop a framework useful for preparing appropriate solutions. These solutions should ensure the maintenance of a high standard of public discourse and information in Italy and also be functional in strengthening coordination and cooperation mechanisms at the multilateral, European, and international levels.

To achieve this goal, both this report, which details the work done so far, its theoretical approach, and recommendations for the development of research in the coming months and years, and a concise "practical manual" have been drafted. The manual includes guidelines and policy indications to prevent or contain the effects of information operations in the Italian context, whether carried out by state or private actors.

This research unfolded in three parts:

1. The first part focused on the theoretical definition of the scope of study of information operations.
2. The second part, empirical research, analyzed two case studies related to information networks in Italy and the use of techniques and strategies for the dissemination of misleading information:

• A case study concerned groups associated with the QAnon conspiracy theory.
• Another case study focused on groups linked to anti-vaccination conspiracies during the vaccine rollout.

1. The third part concentrated on the comparative study of legislation related to disinformation and information operations. It involved a literature review of existing policies and a comparison of measures introduced in different legal systems, particularly the European Union, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States.

From the empirical research conducted, this research group found that:

• Groups organizing and spreading disinformation campaigns in Italy are highly organized from a technical and infrastructural perspective. They assemble digital disinformation infrastructures that initially rely on social media pages and accounts but then expand to include websites, news aggregators, databases, alternative (dis)information channels, blogs, forums, etc. These infrastructures are managed by key figures such as "disinfluencers" (see glossary definition), who are assisted by a loyal army of followers interested in the cause. The active collaboration and participation of followers are essential for the dissemination and maintenance of disinformation infrastructures over time.
• The importance of considering the temporal aspect when intervening against online disinformation campaigns, such as deplatforming these groups from major social media platforms, is highlighted. If deplatforming does not occur promptly, its effectiveness in eradicating these groups and limiting the impact of campaigns will be limited. If deplatforming is implemented after the infrastructure has passed the critical initial phase of expansion and stabilization, groups will have had time to build escape routes and alternative channels to redirect and cultivate new traffic in case of deplatforming. The central role of Telegram and messaging apps in general as a safe haven for disinfluencers and their audience in case of deplatforming should be noted. It is also emphasized that deplatforming is never a definitive solution but must be carried out iteratively as disinformation groups develop precise tactics and strategies to adapt to new technical conditions.
• The anthropological study of disinfluencers responsible for activating and spreading these infrastructures revealed that they belong to professional categories such as lawyers, doctors, freelancers, journalists, and politicians. This finding contrasts with the tendency to characterize "disinformed" individuals as having low levels of education or belonging to less affluent classes. Disinformation campaigns are constructed by "disinformation professionals," and the phenomenon of disinformation takes on the characteristics of a professional practice rather than a role-playing game, religious cult, or pastime (as it has been characterized in the past). It is also noted that these disinfluencers often derive monetary gains from their activities both online and offline, for example, by selling products, membership cards, or requesting offers and donations.
• The central role of traditional media in giving voice to and amplifying disinformation campaigns originating on the internet is also evident. It should be noted that this process does not always occur intentionally. For example, regarding media coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic and vaccines, there was widespread unpreparedness among Italian media in describing scientific processes accurately and truthfully. Particularly problematic was the sensationalization rather than the normalization of factors such as uncertainty and the procedural nature of scientific processes—factors constitutive of science that should not be presented as problematic or anomalous but explained and normalized. Two specific responses are recommended. Firstly, the adoption of strategic silence by the media, a tactic of journalistic coordination that involves a conscious awareness of the media's role in amplifying disinformation campaigns. This entails the decision not to give visibility to such campaigns carried out by disinformation groups. Secondly, the development of a journalistic curriculum aimed at educating new generations of journalists on specific strategies for covering scientifically oriented news and, more generally, on how online disinformation works.

For a better understanding of the long-term phenomenon and to develop appropriate technical and regulatory countermeasures, this research group also recommends promoting exchange and collaboration between universities, public institutions, and private companies. This can be achieved through the allocation of structural funds to create and maintain research and discussion groups at the national and international levels, both formal and informal.

Read the entire research HERE

Summary by Irene Pasquetto, Research Director for the design, media, and disinformation part, Harvard Kennedy School/University of Michigan.